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1 For Stanley Cavell, the specific and contemporary theme of the ordinary sets off from
America and the transcendentalism of Emerson and Thoreau, in order to reinvent itself in
Europe with ordinary language philosophy – Wittgenstein and Austin. But in order to
understand this, it is necessary to perceive what Cavell calls, inspired by Wittgenstein and
Thoreau,  “the  uncanniness  of  the  ordinary,”  inherent  to  its  anthropological
thematization. In his preface to the recent work of Veena Das, Life and Words, Cavell (2007)
notes that the ordinary is our ordinary language in so far as we constantly render it
foreign to ourselves,  which invokes  the Wittgensteinian image of  the philosopher as
explorer of a foreign tribe: this tribe, it is we who are foreigners and strange to ourselves
– “at home perhaps nowhere, perhaps anywhere.” This intersection of the familiar and
the strange, shared by anthropology and philosophy, is the location of the ordinary:
Wittgenstein’s anthropological perspective is one puzzled in principle by anything
human beings say and do, hence perhaps, at a moment, by nothing.
2 The ordinary does not exactly mean common. It is not determined by a web of beliefs, or
of  shared  dispositions.  Common  language,  the  fact  of  being  able  to  speak  together,
nevertheless  defines  the  ordinary:  between  the  ordinary  (everyday,  shared  life)  and
ordinary  language,  between  the  proximity  to  ordinary  life  called  for  in  American
transcendentalism,  in film and literature which inherit  it  and the ordinary language
philosophy of  Wittgenstein and Oxford,  the ordinary is  the search for a new land to
discover and explore, then to describe. The thought of the ordinary is experimental: in
aiming  to  describe  ordinary  experience,  it  brings  together  words  and  world.  From
Emerson to Wittgenstein, from Austin to Goffman, we will attempt to retrace these routes
and to make heard these contemporary and unrecognized voices of the ordinary, which
demand new forms of attention to the human form of life and another understanding of
pragmatism.
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“I Ask Not For The Great, The Remote, The Romantic…”
3 Let us start from Concord, and from the hypothesis of Cavell: that the distinctive feature
of American thought, its capacity to begin philosophy again in America, is found in its
invention of the ordinary. This new departure of philosophy – which has nothing of the
clean slate to it, but rather, like the Hollywood “remarriage” comedies, it has to do with a
second chance – is a reversal of philosophy’s two inveterate tendencies: the denial of our
ordinary language and of our ordinariness in the philosophical pretension to go beyond
them, to correct them, or again the philosophical pretension to know what we want to
say, what is common to us. The call to the ordinary, or the return to practices is neither
evidence  nor  solution,  as  certain  varieties  of  empiricism  or  sociology  suggest:  it  is
traversed by the “uncanniness of the ordinary.”
4 It is from this perspective that it is necessary to register Cavell’s return to American
authors such as Emerson and Thoreau. Emerson, founding father of American philosophy,
asserts the intellectual independence of America, the appropriation of the ordinary in
contrast to the sublimities inherited from Europe, in a passage of his famous address,
“The American Scholar”:
I ask not for the great, the remote, the romantic; what is doing in Italy or Arabia;
what is Greek art or Provençal minstrelry; I embrace the common, I explore and sit
at the feet of the familiar, the low. Give me insight into today, and you may have
the antique and future worlds. (Emerson 1837: 171)
5 Admittedly,  recourse  to  the  “common,”  to  the  “low” has  existed  for  a  long  time in
philosophy, and plays a central role in English thought. But there is a new accent on the
ordinary here.  It  is  not  a  matter of  praising common sense but  of  bringing back all
thought to the ordinary, to those categories of the ordinary – the low, the close at hand –
which precisely stand in opposition to the great and the remote, and allow for “knowing
the meaning” of ordinary life…
What would we really know the meaning of? The meal in the firkin; the milk in the
pan; the ballad in the street; the news of the boat; the glance of the eye; the form
and the gait of the body. (Ibid.)
6 Emerson expresses here the demand for a distinctive American culture, as an alternative
to European culture,  and which would be defined by this  positive aspiration for  the
common. He described, in advance, the privileged objects of American film, or those of
photography, as though it were necessary to renounce “sophisticated” European art in
order to envisage truly American ordinary art.
His  list  in  “The  American  Scholar”  of  the  matters  whose  “ultimate  reason”  he
demands of students to know – […] – is a list epitomizing what we may call the
physiognomy of the ordinary, a form of what Kierkegaard calls the perception of
the sublime in the everyday. It is a list, made three or four years before Daguerre
will exhibit his copper plates in Paris, epitomizing the obsessions of photography.
(Cavell 1972: 150)
7 It is not only a matter of art in this aesthetic of the ordinary, but of perception of reality.
There is the elaboration of a list of new categories, those of the ordinary, more precisely
of the elements of a physiognomy, of a gait, or of a ‘look’ of the ordinary, that philosophy,
but  also  film  and  photography,  would  have  to  describe.  It  is  as  if  the  classic
transcendental question has transformed itself: the question is no longer about knowing
the “ultimate reason” of the phenomena of nature, but of establishing a connection to
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ordinary  life  and  to  its  details,  its  particularities.  For  Emerson,  this  new  approach,
particularist and perceptual, is inseparable from a new relationship between classes, from
a democratization even of perception.
One of these signs is the fact that the same movement which effected the elevation
of what was called the lowest class in the state, assumed in literature a very marked
and as benign an aspect. Instead of the sublime and beautiful, the near, the low, the
common, was explored and poeticized. That which had been negligently trodden
under foot by those who were harnessing and provisioning themselves for long
journeys into far countries, is suddenly found to be richer than all foreign parts.
The literature of the poor, the feelings of the child, the philosophy of the street, the
meaning of household life, are the topics of the time. (Emerson 1982 [1837]: 565)
8 The poor, the child, the street, the household: these are the new objects that it will be
necessary to see. For Cavell as for Wittgenstein, the task of philosophy is to bring back the
ordinary to us – to bring our words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use –
which is neither easy nor obvious.
In this he joins his thinking with the new poetry and art of his times, whose topics
he  characterizes  as  “the  literature  of  the  poor,  the  feelings  of  the  child,  the
philosophy of the street, the meaning of the household life. I note that when he
describes himself  as asking “not for the great,  the remote,  the romantic,” he is
apparently not considering that the emphasis on the low and the near is exactly the
opposite face of the romantic, the continued search for a new intimacy in the self’s
relation to its world. (Cavell, “An Emerson Mood,” 149-50)
9 The search for the ordinary takes its meaning from the menace of skepticism – of the loss
of  or  distance  from  the  world.  As  he  presents  it  at  the  beginning  of  his  essay
“Experience,” Emerson associates this loss with the failure of speech, which by definition
renders it  inadequate,  or unhappy – it  is a matter of infelicity of language.  It  is this
essential inadequacy of language that in “Self-Reliance,” Emerson calls the conformity of
his contemporaries, and that Thoreau denounces as “quiet desperation.”
Their every truth is not quite true. Their two is not the real two, their four not the
real four; so that every word they say chagrins us, and we know not where to begin
to set them right. (Emerson 1990: 34)
10 The call  to  the  ordinary  is  inseparable  from this  skeptical  moment  when the  world
radically  chagrins  us,  when (because)  we want  most  strongly  to  grasp it,  to  seize  it
conceptually and possessively, it evades us, according to Emerson. In their defense of the
ordinary against the vain wish to conceptualize and grasp reality, Emerson and Thoreau
are thus the precursors of ordinary language philosophy, recommending, instead, the
attentive description of reality: being next to the world (both close and separate).
The  connection  means  that  I  see  both  developments  –  ordinary  language
philosophy and American transcendentalism – as responses to skepticism, to that
anxiety about our human capacities as knowers. My route to the connection lay at
once in my tracing both the ordinary language philosophy as well as the American
transcendentalists to the Kantian insight that Reason dictates what we mean by a
world. (Cavell 1988a, p. 4)
11 Our  connection  to  the  ordinary  is  another  way  of  formulating  the  question  of  our
connection to reality,  and of  our ability to say things with our ordinary and shared
language.  For  Emerson,  America  must  reinvent  transcendental  philosophy,  while
following its own methods, temperaments, and moods. It must then invent an access to
the ordinary, a specific mode of approach of this new nature – for which the categories of
transcendental  philosophy,  to  some extent  the  conceptual  mode  of  access  to  nature
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developed by Europe,  are inoperative.  A new education is  necessary.  Thoreau puts it
nicely in Walden:
It is time that we had uncommon schools, that we did not leave off our education
when we begin to be men and women. It is time that villages were universities.
Shall the world be confined to one Paris or one Oxford forever? Cannot students be
boarded here and get  a  liberal  education under the skies  of  Concord? (Thoreau
1954, ch. 3)
12 To return to ordinary language is to speak seriously – to respect its speech, to take up the
Austinian theme. It is not a matter of discovering an authentic and original meaning of
words, a myth that Wittgenstein unravels in the first lines of The Blue Book. As Cavell says,
“Words come to us from a distance; they were there before we were; we are born into
them. Meaning them is accepting that fact of their condition” (1972: 64). The meaning of
a word is its use – to borrow Wittgenstein’s phrase: “We do not know what “Walden”
means if we do not know what Walden is” (ibid.: 27). And thus of all the words employed
by Thoreau, to which he gives a new sense: morning (morning is when I am awakening
and there is the dawn in me), the bottom of the pond (we do not know what the base is, or
the foundation, so long as we have not probed, like Thoreau, the bottom of Walden Pond),
the sun (a morning star).
13 “Discovering what is said to us, just like discovering what we say, is to discover the exact
place of where it is said; to understand why it is said at this precise place, here and now” (
ibid.: 34). It is the education, or the method of ordinary language: to see why, when, we
say what we say, in which circumstances – because without its use a word is a “dead sign”
(Wittgenstein 1958: 3). It is not a matter of discovering an authentic or hidden meaning of
words. Everything is already in front of us, displayed before our eyes: stay to see the
visible.  Thoreau  thus  announces,  like  Emerson,  the  anthropological  project  of  the
Investigations: to see the ordinary, which escaped us because it is near to us, beneath our
eyes.
What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings;
we are not contributing curiosities, however, but observations which no one has
doubted, but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our
eyes. (Wittgenstein, PI §415)
14 One could return to a beautiful formulation of Foucault, where the important point is that
he connects  this  ability  to “see the visible” to ordinary language philosophy and its
project of using usage to discover what is actually going on : “faire une analyse critique de
la pensée à partir de la manière dont on dit les choses”:
We have long known that the role of philosophy is not to discover what is hidden,
but to render visible what precisely is visible – which is to say, to make appear what
is so close, so immediate, so intimately linked to ourselves that, as a consequence,
we do not perceive it. (Foucault 1994 [1978]: 540-1)
15 The ordinary exists only in this characteristic difficulty of access to what is right before
our eyes, and what one must learn to see. It is always an object of investigation – this will
be the approach of pragmatism – and an object of interrogation; it is never given. The low
always has to be reached, in an inversion of the sublime. It is not enough to want to start
from the ordinary, from “the man in the street.” It is not a matter of correcting the
heritage of European philosophy, and of creating new categories: it is necessary to give
another sense to the inherited words (such as  those of  experience,  idea,  impression,
understanding, reason, necessity and condition), to bring them back from the immanent
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to  the  common,  or  from  the  metaphysical  to  the  ordinary,  which  means,  to  make
something else of them.
16 Emerson proposes his own version of categories, in the epigraph to “Experience,” with
the list of “the lords of life”:
The lords of life, the lords of life, – / I saw them pass, / In their own guise, / Like
and  unlike,  /  Portly  and  grim;  /  Use  and  Surprise,  /  Surface  and  Dream,  /
Succession swift, and Spectral Wrong. (Emerson 2005: 77)
17 At first glance, the lords of life resemble categories that control our life, our experience,
and determine our access to the world, as with Kant – those of causality, substance, or
totality. But the list demonstrates well that it cannot be [a matter of] these categories:
use, surprise, surface, dream, succession, evil,  temperament… In Emerson there is the
idea that a new collection of concepts must be invented in order to describe the ordinary,
the given or, rather, the diverse materials, “strewn along the ground.” And it is a new
ordinary man who will need to build or, as he says, “ to domesticate.”
18 This revolution is to be wrought by the gradual domestication of the idea of Culture. The
main enterprise of the world for splendor, for extent, is the upbuilding of man. Here are
the materials strewn along the ground (Emerson 1990: 178).
 
Categories of the Ordinary, Democracy of Experience
19 If Emerson were satisfied with carrying on with the arrangement of the categories, and
substituting for a traditional list (the European transcendental heritage) a modernized,
Americanized list, the contribution would be weak. To imagine categories of the ordinary
alters the very idea of category. The idea of domestication of culture, of the ordinary as
next, as neighbor, is not the idea of mastery of reality – because the ordinary is neither
conceptualized nor grasped: it is an understanding of the connection to the world, not as
knowledge but as proximity and access to things, as attention to them. It is not a matter
of rewriting the list of categories, but of redefining their use: not as conceptual grasping
of reality, but, instead, as neighboring things. It is the recognition [of reality] as next to
me, near or close, but also separated from me, next door. The revolution achieved by
Emerson  consists  less  in  a  re-definition  or  redistribution  of  categories  than  in  a
remodeling of what experience is, which continues from James, to Dewey and Goffman.
20 Hence, our relation to the world is no longer a matter of (actively) applying categories of
understanding to experience but of (passively) watching the lords of life passing by in the
course of experience. They will emerge from experience, suddenly appear – “I find them
in my way” – as if the categories, instead of being imposed or posed, are simply to wait
patiently, and to find:
Illusion,  Temperament,  Succession,  Surface,  Surprise,  Reality,  Subjectiveness  –
these are threads on the loom of time, these are the lords of life. I dare not assume
to give their order, but I name them as I find them in my way. (Emerson 1837: 106)
21 Emerson takes and subverts Kant’s system. The lords of life do not control our perception,
or our experience, they come out from it, like forms on a background: “I saw them pass”
(ibid.). The categories themselves are the object/subject of observation and exploration.
Such  is  the  intellectual  revolution  brought  about  by  transcendentalism.  The
transcendental  question is  no longer:  How do we know to start  from experience? (A
question which, since Hume, one knows leads to the response: one knows nothing at all –
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and thus leads to skepticism.) But rather: How do we approach the world? How do we
have an experience? This difficulty of approaching the world is expressed by Emerson in
“Experience” in regard to the experience of grief, and is generalized to an experience of
the world taken as a whole under the sign (the category) of loss. Skepticism is found
there,  in  the  inability  to  have  an  experience.  We  are  not  as  much  ignorant,  as
inexperienced. William James will follow this thread of Emersonian thought (for example
in The Will to Believe), Dewey will follow it as well by proposing his own categories, and
Wittgenstein probably uses it in his later writings.
22 In Emerson, experience cannot teach us anything, contrary to what “paltry” empiricism
tells us – not because it  is insufficient,  that we must go beyond it,  as the traditional
epistemology asserts, but because it does not touch us. Our attempts to master the world
and things, in order to grasp them in all senses of the term (materially and conceptually)
distance  us  from  them.  It  is  what  Emerson  describes  in  Experience  as  “the  most
unhandsome  part  of  our  condition”  (Emerson  2005:  81)  –  this  fleeting  reality  slips
between our fingers at the moment when, because, we clutch at it: unhandsome. It is our
desire  to  grasp reality  that  causes  us  to  lose it,  our  craving to know (as  theoretical
appropriation and synthesis)  that keeps us from ordinary proximity with things,  and
cancels  their  availability  or  their  attractiveness  (the  fact  that  they  are  at  hand,
handsome). Emerson transforms the Kantian synthesis, not by going the transcendental
way but the opposite,  non romantic way, towards immanence. This surpassing of the
synthesis by the low, and not by the high, is characteristic of Emerson and Thoreau.
Emerson launches into an ironic recapitulation of Cartesian and Kantian themes from the
European theory of knowledge:
It is very unhappy, but too late to be helped, the discovery we have made, that we
exist.  That  discovery is  called the Fall  of  Man.  Ever afterwards,  we suspect  our
instruments. We have learned that we do not see directly, but mediately. (Emerson
1990: 98)
23 It  is  conceptual  activity  as  such  that  must  come  to  renounce  this  “cognitive
rapaciousness”  that  is  unhandsome  (this  hand  and  these  fingers  which  clutch  and
clench). Let us refer to the criticism brought about by Wittgenstein in the Blue Book of the
“craving for generality” characteristic of philosophy. The attention to the particular that
Wittgenstein demands goes against our tendency toward a thorough grasp.
We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed
not  towards  phenomena,  but,  as  one  might  say,  towards  the  ‘possibilities’  of
phenomena.
We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that we make about
phenomena. […] Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. (Wittgenstein PI
§90)
24 When Wittgenstein affirms our impression that we must visually penetrate phenomena,
and  when he  specifies  that  our  “grammatical”  investigation  is  directed  not  towards
phenomena but towards their possibilities, he intends to substitute for the categories an
imaginative grammar of human concepts, a grammar of the particular. The difference
with Kant is that, in Wittgenstein and Emerson, each word of ordinary language, each bit
of ordinary experience, each aspect of the features of the ordinary, they each require a
deduction to know its use: each one must be retraced in its application to the world, by
the criteria of its application. A word, for Emerson and for Wittgenstein, must be stated in
the particular context where it  has a meaning,  or else it  is  false (it  sounds false),  it
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“chagrins me.” In this way, one could read the series of lords not as a renovated list of
categories, but as a grammar of the particular experience.
25 It is in this relation to experience that Emerson (and Dewey) goes perhaps even further
than  Wittgenstein  himself.  For  Wittgenstein  seems,  on  this  point,  dependent  on  a
transcendental  heritage,  with  his  idea  of  the  “possibilities  of  phenomena”  and  his
definition of  grammar as constituent of  these possibilities.  The radical  empiricism of
Emerson consists in saying that speaking of the given is still too much. What interests
him would be, we might say, the “found.” “Finding as founding,” Cavell puts it (1991:79).
26 The ordinary,  then,  is  what escapes us,  what is  distant precisely because we seek to
appropriate it to us rather than letting ourselves go to the things, and to insignificant
encounters: “all our blows glance, all our hits are accidents. Our relations to each other
are oblique and casual,” writes Emerson in Experience. This insistence on the accidental,
the contingent, situates the ambiguity of Emerson. The casual is also misfortune, fatality
– hence his pun casual/casualty: our experiences may be both casual and catastrophic,
and the casual structures ordinary experience, as the low and the near.
27 Transcendentalism is therefore badly named, because what Emerson proposes is a
particular  form of  empiricism,  which  one  might  readily  call  radical  empiricism.  My
perceptions are more reliable than my thoughts; they are fatal, escaping my desire to
grasp the world. So it is from perception, conceived as attraction and as receptivity, that
one will be able to imagine a framework for ordinary experience.
Every  man  discriminates  between  the  voluntary  acts  of  his  mind,  and  his
involuntary perceptions, and knows that to his involuntary perceptions a perfect
faith is due. […] But perception is not whimsical, but fatal. (Emerson 2005: 81)
28 The conversion that  philosophy requires  is  not  the (transcendental)  passage towards
another world. The new America is here, in front of me. And it is only in this ordinary
world that I can change.
Why not realize your world? But far be from me the despair which prejudges the
law by  a  paltry  empiricism –  […]  There  is  victory  yet  for  justice;  and  the  true
romance which the world exists to realize, will be the transformation of genius into
practical power. (Ibid.: 106)
29 To realize the world: Emerson transforms and de-sublimes the transcendental, bringing
the  categories  back  to  the  ordinary,  realizing  the  “possibility”  of  “true  romance,”
realizing genius into practical power. There are no longer two worlds but only one, which
always and ordinarily remains for us to discover and to describe.
30 It is not a ground where I could make myself at home. Emerson and Thoreau are thinkers
of  migration  (not  just  of  the  ground or  of  identity):  for  them it  is  not  a  matter  of
“dwelling” but of always leaving. Starting off is what counts, being always ready to go,
not  attachment  or  rootedness,  which  are  synonymous  with  being  stationed,  or  with
clutching, with clenching the nation or oneself.
But in truth all is now to be begun, and every new mind ought to take the attitude
of Columbus, launch out from the gaping loiterers on the shore, and sail west for a
new world. (The Senses and the Soul, in Emerson 1990)
31 The pioneer is one of the exemplary figures of this impulse to set off. The pioneer (like
Will Hunting at the end of Gus Van Sant’s film by that name, or like the hero of Francis
Ford Coppola’s  Rumblefish)  moves toward the West,  which is  also the East  where the
sunrises, since we now know that the Earth is round and that the sun “is but a morning
star,” as Thoreau puts it in the last sentence of Walden.
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The Importance of Importance
32 By claiming the ordinary, Emerson calls for a revolution (“Here are the materials strewn
along the ground”). The American hope becomes that of the construction of a new man
and culture, both “domesticated,” which is the opposite of oppressed and enslaved: the
domestic man is the one who comes to harmonize his interior and his exterior, his public
voice and his private voice, without renouncing one or the other. The construction of
American democracy is  the invention of  an ordinary man:  “the upbuilding of  man.”
Public expression is then founded on self-trust,  which is not trust in a pre-given self
(philosophy  of  the  ordinary  is  not  a  philosophy  of  subjectivity)  but  trust  in  one’s
experience.
33 To  trust  in  one’s  experience:  this  defines  the  recourse  to  practice,  in  a  genuinely
empirical  move.  One  could  explore  the  political  implications  of  this  trust  with  the
question of civil disobedience. Cavell has applied it in the first place to film and what it
teaches us. In Pursuits of Happiness, he examines the act of “checking one’s experience,”
which is to say, of examining one’s own experience, of “let[ting] the object or the work of
your interest teach you how to consider it.” To educate one’s experience, so as to be made
educable by it. To be interested in film as works of thought means to be interested in our
experience of film. That means a displacement of the object of the investigation from the
object to the experience I have of the object, “the interest I bring to my own experience.”
It means a reliance on the experience of the object, in order to find the right words to
describe and express it. For Cavell, it is the viewing (repeated and common) of films that
leads to trusting one’s own experience, and to acquiring at the same time an authority
over it. “[It] is a conceptual as much as an experiential undertaking […]. I think of this as
checking one’s experience” (1981: 18). Cavell returns then to “the empiricism practiced
by Emerson and Thoreau.” Empiricism thus re-read defines the paradoxical link between
experience and trust: it is necessary to educate one’s experience in order to trust it. Here
is a new reversal of the Kantian inheritance: not to go beyond experience via theory, but
to go in reverse from what is, in philosophy, the very movement of knowledge; to go
beyond theory via experience. The trust in self is defined by the ordinary and expressive
authority  one  has  over  one’s  experience:  “Without  this  trust  in  one’s  experience,
expressed as a willingness to find words for it, […] one is without authority in one’s own
experience”  (ibid.: 19).  The  trust  consists  of  discovering  in  oneself  (in  one’s
“constitution,” says Emerson, in the political and subjective sense) the capacity to have
an experience,  and to express and describe this ordinary experience.  This is also the
definition of ordinary experience for Wittgenstein, and what for Freud, one expects from
psychoanalysis (to gather and remind, re-allocate – re-member – the scattered scraps and
memories of words and uses). One finds this approach to ordinary experience as well in
William James’ radical empiricism, and in Dewey’s theory of inquiry, and in Henry James’
literary concepts: what is important is to have an experience (cf. Dewey 1934).
34 To have an experience means: to perceive what is important. What interests Cavell in film
is the way our experience makes what counts emerge, be seen. Cavell is interested in the
development of a capacity to see the importance, the appearance, and the significance of
things (places, people, motifs):
The moral I draw is this: the question what becomes of objects when they are filmed
and screened – like the question what becomes of particular people, and specific
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locales, and subjects and motifs when they are filmed by individual makers of film –
has only one source of data for its answer, namely the appearance and significance
of just those objects and people that are in fact to be found in the succession of
films, or passages of films, that matter to us. (Cavell, 1998b : 182-3)
35 What defines importance, circularly, is – “To express their appearances, and define those
significances, and articulate the nature of this mattering” (Cavell, 1998b: 183).
If it is part of the grain of film to magnify the feeling and meaning of a moment, it is
equally part of it to counter this tendency, and instead to acknowledge the fateful
fact of a human life that the significance of its moments is ordinarily not given with
the moments as they are lived, so that to determine the significant crossroads of a
life may be the work of a lifetime. (Cavell, 1998b: 11)
36 Experience turns out to be defined by our capacity for attention: our capacity to see the
detail, the expressive gesture, even if it is not necessarily a clear and sharp picture, nor
exhaustive. It is attention to what matters, to what counts in the expressions and styles of
others – what makes and shows the differences between people, the relation each has to
his/her experience – that we must then describe.
To recognize restores, manners, habits, turns of speech, turns of thought, styles of
face  as  morally  expressive  –  of  an  individual  or  of  a  people.  The  intelligent
description of life, of what matters, makes differences, in human lives. (Diamond
1991: 375)
37 These  are  the  differences  which  must  be  the  object  of  “the  intelligent,  sharp-eyed,
description of life.” This human life refers to the Wittgensteinian form of life, seen not as
a social norm, but as the context where gestures, manners, and ordinary styles are visible.
In this way, attention to the ordinary, “to what we would like to know the meaning of”
(Emerson 1982: 564), is the perception of textures or of moral motifs. What is perceived
are not objects, but expressions, which is only possible against the background of the
form of life. Literature is the privileged place of this perception, through the creation of a
background that reveals the important differences between the expressions. Film also for
Cavell is the medium of moral expression.
38 It is a matter of a competence which has to do not only with knowledge or reasoning, but
with learning the suitable expression, and with an education of sensibility: education of
the reader’s sensibility by the author, who renders such a situation, such a character
perceptible,  while  placing it  (describing it)  in  the appropriate  framework.  The novel
teaches  us  to  look  at  ordinary  life  as  “the  scene  of  adventure  and  improvisation,”
beginning with the appropriate modes of expression, linguistic or other: a development
of  sensitivity  through  exemplarity.  The  novel  shapes  our  capacity  to  read  moral
expression – the capacity to make use of  words to describe moral  experience of  the
particular.
39 The attention that  the Henry James novel  suggests  and provokes makes the reader’s
experience an adventure (in Emerson’s words, “true romance”). There is adventure in any
situation that  mixes  uncertainty  and the “taste  for  life.”  James  notes,  regarding the
novels  of  George  Eliot,  that  the  emotions,  the  tormented  intelligence,  and  the
consciousness of its heroes become “our own adventure” (see Laugier 2006).
A  human,  a  personal  ‘adventure’  is  no  a  priori,  no  positive  and  absolute  and
inelastic  thing,  but  just a  matter  of  relation  and  appreciation  –  a  name  we
conveniently give, after the fact, to any passage, to any situation, that has added
the sharp taste of uncertainty to a quickened sense of life. Therefore the thing is, all
beautifully, a matter of interpretation and of the particular conditions; without a
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view of which latter some of the most prodigious adventures, as one has often had
occasion to say, may vulgarly show for nothing. (James, 1934: 286)
40 Experience itself, if one trusts it, becomes an adventure. To refuse this trust is to miss out
on this part of the adventure – the character’s adventure, and one’s own adventure. Lack
of attention to experience, the failure to perceive its importance, causes one to miss out,
to miss what happens. The stipulation found in the ethnomethodology will combine the
heritage of Wittgenstein, Emerson, and pragmatism: Do not miss out, do not miss the
thing for lack of comprehension and sensitivity to the fluctuations of the circumstances
of action when it happens.
41 Thus one can see experience as a conceptual and sensible adventure at the same time - in
other  words:  simultaneously  passive  (one  lets  oneself  be  transformed,  touched)  and
active.  In  experience,  there  is  no  separating  thought  (spontaneity)  and  receptivity
(vulnerability), comprehension and perception. It is this, for James, which “constitutes
experience:”
The power to guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implication of things, to
judge the whole piece by the pattern, the condition of feeling life, in general, so
completely that you are well on your way to knowing any particular corner of it –
this cluster of gifts may almost be said to constitute experience. (H. James “The Art
of Fiction,” 10-1)
42 James adds that one must let nothing escape, let nothing be wasted on oneself: “Try to be
one of the people on whom nothing is lost.” It also opens toward a specific capacity, for
the attention or care to detail, which brings about the humanity to the description of the
ordinary (Laugier 2005).
43 So  how are  we  to  recover  this  elusive  ordinary  life?  How  are  we  to  know what  is
important without being focused on only the pertinent? To realize what one wants to say,
to be precisely expressed, would be to manage to put the phrase into context. To take up
an expression of Wittgenstein, it would be to restore the phrase to its country of origin,
its “natural environment.” This is the task Wittgenstein assigns to ordinary language
philosophy: “To bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” (PI 
§ 116). But in the ordinary there is nothing to recover. Cavell says of Thoreau, “Walden
was always gone, from the beginning of the words of Walden” (Cavell 1972: 119). “The
only  assurance  registered  in  the  use  of  my  speech,  is  that  of  abandonment,  of  the
departure that one constantly finds in American thought – of departure, of the road. I am
no longer here where one expects me. I’m not there.”
44 If conversation is acceptance of the linguistic condition – our form of life in language –
and of exposure to others, film is the privileged place for such an (over) exposure, and
the actor has this capacity, by supporting the expression, of constituting the experience
of the spectator. The experience of film becomes experience itself (as Kant says, there is
only one experience), and it belongs to our ordinary existence, without constituting a
separate world. Cinematographic projection proves to be the answer, through its mimesis
of  ordinary  conversation,  to  skeptical  questioning,  to  the  philosophical  search  for
adequacy in the world. The moments of adequacy between an expression and a world that
film offers us exist only through the natural expressivity of the ordinary human body.
This is what Emerson demanded: “What would we really know the meaning of? […] the
form and the gait of the body.” These meanings and moods are manifested – to anticipate
here the ethnographic analyses of Goffman – through the ordinary human conversational
gesture.
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45 It is this echo of Emerson’s demand that one hears in Wittgenstein (whose interest in
cinematographic experience is known). It returns to Cavell to disclose the transatlantic
connection  hidden  between  ordinary  life,  language,  and  natural  expressivity.
Conversation in film is bodily expression: Cavell notes that the dialogues of a film cannot
be reproduced, and do not give anything when they are spoken (except if one speaks
about it with somebody who saw the film, returning to a shared experience of the vision
of the dialogue). The conversation is intended to be viewed. The success of a dialogue on
screen, these moments of conversational felicity that the grand Hollywood films offer,
exist only in their temporal and fleeting projection: “they have to be taken from the page
and put back […] onto the screen” (Cavell 1981: 11). In this way, the films respond to the
failures  of  experience  (infelicities,  misfires,  in  the  Austinian  register),  through  the
successes/felicities of conversation, which are rare and memorable, as Goffman notes in
Frame Analysis.
46 These memorable moments are fragments, privileged fragments of experience, which will
constitute the subjective grammar of it, the expression of the importance.
[These] films […] bear in their experience as memorable public events, segments of
the experiences, the memories, of a common life. So that the difficulty of assessing
them is the same as the difficulty of assessing everyday experience, the difficulty of
expressing oneself satisfactorily. (Cavell 1981: 41)
 
Linguistic Phenomenology as a Pragmatic Approach
of the Ordinary
47 In  the  ordinary  of  ordinary  language  one  can  see  a  pluralistic  reformulation  of  the
question of the description of ordinary experience: ordinary language philosophy, which,
following Wittgenstein, confronts the failures of practiced language in its description.
The  next  stop  along  the  ordinary’s  transatlantic  circuit  is  thus  Great  Britain.  The
exploration of uses is an inventory of our forms of life: for Austin, we examine “what we
would say when” (Austin 1962: 182). It is a matter of saying not only what we say, (a theme
of the common, of agreement, of consent within language; cf. Wittgenstein 1953) but also
“which words to employ in which situations,” (id.) what is fitting to the circumstances or
allows one to act on them. Austin makes clear: “we are not looking merely at words, but
also  at  the  realities  we  use  the  words  to  talk  about.  We  are  using  our  sharpened
awareness of words to sharpen our perception, though not as the final arbiter of, the
phenomena”  (1962:  182).  The  language  of  description  is  then  a  tool  for  focusing,
associated with agreement and with the perception of the important detail.
48 To speak about ordinary language is to speak about the world, but this does not happen
through a miraculous connection of language-thought to reality: It happens on condition
of precisely describing the uses of language and their differences. To say is to perceive.
“For defining an elephant (supposing we ever do this) is a compendious description of an
operation involving both word and animal (do we focus the image or the battleship?)” (
ibid.: 124) Austin, by advocating the description of uses, seeks this relation of words and
the world (words/world again).
49 The theme of the ordinary introduces skepticism into practice: certainty, or trust in what
we do (play, argue, value, promise), models itself on the trust that we have in our shared
uses of language and our capacity for using it well. The enigma of speaking the same
language – the uncanniness of the use of ordinary language – is the possibility for me of
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speaking in the name of others, and vice versa. It is not enough to invoke commonness; it
remains to be known what authorizes me to speak,  what is  the real  strength of  the
agreement.
It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language
they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. (Wittgenstein PI
§ 241)
50 It  is  crucial  for Cavell  that  Wittgenstein says that  we agree in and not on language,
language  as  spoken.  That  means  we are  not  actors  of  the  agreement,  that  language
precedes this agreement as much as it  is  produced by the latter,  and that this same
circularity makes the assertion of  a primacy of  agreement or of  human coordination
(joint attention or common absorption) impossible:
We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect
others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this
projection will  take  place  (in  particular,  not  the  grasping of  universals  nor  the
grasping of  books of  rules)  […].  It  is  a  vision as  simple as  it  is  difficult,  and as
difficult as it is (and because it is) terrifying. (Cavell 1969: 52)
51 To agree in language means that language produces our agreement as much as it is the
product of an agreement; that it is natural for us, and that the idea of convention is to
mimic and mask this need.  “Underlying the tyranny of convention is  the tyranny of
nature,” according to Cavell:
Here the array of “conventions” are not patterns of life which differentiate human
beings from one another,  but those exigencies  of  conduct and feeling which all
humans  share.  Wittgenstein’s  discovery,  or  rediscovery,  is  of  the  depth  of
convention in human life; a discovery which insists not only on the conventionality
of human society but, we could say, on the conventionality of human nature itself.
(Cavell 1979: 110-1)
52 This natural link between language agreement and conventions is fundamental in Austin,
and defines the conditions of felicity for our use of language. “Performatives, if adequate
to reality, are felicitous, if not, then, in specific ways, infelicitous” (Cavell 1984: 81). This
attention, centered on failure as much, and even more, than on success, is characteristic
of Austin, who will allow the theme of the ordinary to return to America, this time in
sociological description. Linguistic phenomenology returns in a sociological form with
Goffman, whose work echoes Cavell’s in its discovery of the ordinary. One of the goals of
ordinary language philosophy is to determine the various ways for an utterance to be
infelicitous, inadequate to reality, to fail. One of the goals of Goffman’s sociology will be
to  determine  the  ways  for  our  actions,  our  behavior,  to  be  infelicitous.  Austin,  like
Goffman,  wants  to give the conditions of  felicitous language as  ordinary practice,  to
highlight the vulnerability of our uses, and to provide some tools for adequate repairs
(excuses, arrangements: see Laugier 2008).
53 The question is no longer exactly of agreement in language. Austin moves the difficulty,
so often invoked in philosophy, of “arriving at an agreement” on an opinion or a theory,
to another,  to agreeing on a starting point,  on a given,  or,  more precisely,  a ground
agreement on “what we would say when.” This agreement, adds Austin, is an “agreement
on the manner of determining a certain given,” “on a certain way, one, to describe and to
know the facts.” The agreement must be about the methods of the description of what
happens.
Here at last we should be able to unfreeze, to loosen up and get going on agreeing
about discoveries, however small, and on agreeing about how to reach agreement.
(Austin 1962: 183)
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54 Agreement and discovery are possible because 1) ordinary language cannot claim to be
the last word; “we should simply remember that it is the first word” (ibid.: 2) ordinary
language is a collection of differences, and “contains all the distinctions that humans
have judged useful to make,” more subtle and solid than “those which we could, you or
me,  find,  settled  in  an  armchair  on  a  beautiful  afternoon  –  the  more  appreciated
methodological alternative” (ibid.). It is this capacity to mark and inventory differences
that makes language an adequate instrument of perception: because reality is made up of
these details and differences (which show up in the account we give them).
55 From this perspective, one can better understand the enigmatic passage in “A Plea for
Excuses” where Austin excuses himself from speaking about linguistic phenomenology in
order  to  assert  the fact  that  the conscience refined by words  is  the refinement  and
education of our perception.
When we examine what we should say when, we are looking again not merely at
words (or meanings’ whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use the
words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our
perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena. For this reason I
think  it  might  be  better  to  use,  for  this  way  of  doing  philosophy,  some  less
misleading name than those given above–for instance, “linguistic phenomenology.”
(Austin 1962: 182)
56 It is in this theme of differences and resemblances (a common theme with Wittgenstein)
that ordinary, natural realism is constituted; ‘natural,’ to borrow an expression Hilary
Putnam (2001)  used regarding Austin,  James,  and Wittgenstein.  The distinctions  that
establish  ordinary  language  philosophy,  notes  Cavell,  are  natural,  drawn  from
observation, not manufactured like those of philosophers and theorists of language:
One  of  Austin’s  most  furious  perceptions  is  of  the  slovenliness,  the  grotesque
crudity and fatuousness, of the usual distinctions philosophers have traditionally
thrown up. Consequently, one form his investigations take is that of repudiating
the  distinctions  lying  around  philosophy  –  dispossessing  them,  as  it  were,  by
showing better ones. And better not merely because finer, but because more solid,
having, so to speak, a greater natural weight; appearing normal, even inevitable,
when the others are luridly arbitrary; useful where the others seem twisted; real
where the others are academic. (Cavell 1969: 103)
57 The inventory of differences creates the link between language and reality. It is in this
sense  that  philosophy  is  fieldwork/groundwork.  One  then  understands  Austin’s
fundamental  intuition,  which  Goffman  will  develop  in  a  more  complete  way,  that
language itself is something to perceive, framed, like contextualized practice, and it is as
practice that it will fit or not: “fit the facts more or less loosely” (Austin 1961: 108). So for
him, “fit” indicates a concept that is neither ‘correspondence,’ nor ‘correction,’ but rather
“fit” as the appropriate character, the proper statement in the circumstance. In his later
philosophy, Wittgenstein also describes this indissociably social and perceptive moment
when agreement in language – human coordination – is a matter of keen observation and
adjustment to the action, yet also “found,” “met” as if the same contingency of “falling
into place just so” defined agreement in language: das treffende Wort (Wittgenstein, PI II,
XI)
58 In this agreement, in [what is] “achieved through mapping the fields of consciousness lit
by the occasions of a word” (Cavell 1969: 100), Austin registers the possibility of finding
an ordinary adequacy to the world. This possibility is founded on the reality of language
as  the  social  activity  of  maintaining  the  world:  conversation/conservation.  Ordinary
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language is a tool; it represents experience and inherited perspicacity – a tool to mark
differentiations. Consider, for example, the classification of actions in “Excuses” or the
distinction  at  work  in  “Three  Ways  of  Spilling  Ink,”  between  spilling  intentionally,
deliberately, purposely – the minute detail of human action in its capacity for disaster,
casualty.
59 Goffman,  returning explicitly to Austin,  articulates the accuracy of  the perception of
“what  happens,”  the  access  to  reality  (returning  to  William James’s  chapter  on  the
principles of psychology entitled “The Perception of Reality” [1890]), and the felicity of
speech. In Felicity’s Condition, Goffman integrates the conditions of Austinian felicity
with the condition of the interaction’s felicity, adding his characteristic discovery to the
Austinian  given.  There  is  a  definition  of  felicity  common  to  Austin  and  Goffman:
normality,  and  maintenance  of  the  expressive  order.  The  order  present  within  the
ordinary (interaction order), is defined by the threat of embarrassment or breakdown.
The felicity is minimal (appearance of sanity) and maximal. On the one hand, it is easy to
fail: the possibility of conversational failure sums up the vulnerability of human action, of
the ordinary form of life. On the other hand, felicity sums up our chance to have a world –
this new America, always unapproachable. Here, Goffman is the heir at the same time to
the transcendentalist quest, the pragmatist investigation, and linguistic phenomenology.
Moments of social  disorganization – like moments of rupture in interaction, or more
radically, like the irruption of mentally disturbed behavior in a family – are moments of
loss: a loss of the experience itself. We saw that with his insistence on failure, Austin
highlights  the  vulnerability  of  ordinary  human action,  defined  on  the  model  of  the
performative utterance, as what can turn out badly. Thus the pragmatic theme (the title
“How to do things with words” was chosen by Austin for his William James Lectures in
ironic homage to the pragmatist maxim) is inversed; action is articulated through speech,
defined and regulated by failure, “going wrong.” Goffman defines the human character of
action by taking a chance. Action means (analytically) that there is damage incurred to
oneself and to others and that one takes risks (a threat to one’s face or of others) because
of the circumstances of the action.
60 This is what the whole Austinian theory of excuses – which follows the description of the
philosophy of language as fieldwork – shows. Excuses – what we say when it appears we
have acted or done badly (awkwardly, inadequately, etc.) – excuses let us know what an
action is, they let us begin to classify and differentiate what we gather under the general
term ‘action.’ Excuses are essential to human action – they do not in some way come
“afterwards.” The variety of excuses shows the impossibility of defining agency otherwise
than in the detail and diversity of our modes of description and clarification, in the styles
of accomplishment (or non-accomplishment) of action, and in the manner or look that
one wants to give it.
61 It  is  a  matter  of  seeing  the  whole  human  form  of  life  as  vulnerable,  defined  by  a
constellation of possible failures, of ways that we have of compensating, of strategies that
we have for forgiving or forgetting, for leveling things, and for swallowing our difficult
condition as creatures of failure.  Goffman, in “Cooling the mark out” examines cases
where it  is  necessary to support someone in the suffering of  a radical  social  failure.
Goffmanian  interaction  analysis  assigns  a  place  to  ordinary  disorders,  agitations,
embarrassments, shame, uneasiness in trespassing encounters, intrusions, offences, and
violations  at  the  surface  of  “normal  appearances,”  all  of  which  make  us  suffer  the
fragility of the ordinary conceived as intimately connected to order. Concern with excuses
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and reparation due to others is indeed the transatlantic link from Austin to Goffman, who
brings Oxford back to America and to Chicago – all the way to Goffman’s last great work,
Frame Analysis : Essay on the Organization of Experience. The ordinary is redefined once again
on American ground,  and is  redefined as  reality  itself,  seen as  itself  vulnerable  –  to
others,  and  to  our  perceptions.  Ordinary  language  philosophy  and,  specifically,  the
discovery of speech acts are being linked to this problematic of the failure, transgression,
and vulnerability of the social person. Cavell couples this vulnerability to the reality of
this expressive body.
62 By introducing Oxford ordinary language philosophy to it, Frame Analysis achieves the
Emersonian and pragmatist project of categorization of the ordinary: “to take ordinary
activity seriously as a ‘paramount part of reality’.” Goffman returns to Dewey as well as to
William James, using widely The Perception of Reality.
63 But here Henry James may be even closer to this conception of the ordinary that stems
from Emerson. For James experience – our capacity to feel life in general and in detail – is
constituted by our attention.  He follows Emerson (and will  somehow be followed by
Dewey) in his idea that the most difficult is not (as the European epistemology taught us)
to learn (or derive knowledge) from experience, but to HAVE an experience. Our problem,
as Cavell beautifully says, is that we are inexperienced.
Experience is never limited and it is never complete; it is an immense sensibility, a
kind of huge spider-web, of the finest silken threads, suspended in the chamber of
consciousness and catching every air-borne particle in its tissue. [...] The power to
guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implication of things, to judge the
whole piece by the pattern, the condition of feeling life, in general, so completely
that you are well on your way to knowing any particular corner of it–this cluster of
gifts may almost be said to constitute experience. Therefore, if I should certainly
say to a novice, “Write from experience, and experience only,” I should feel that
this was a rather tantalising monition if I were not careful immediately to add, “Try
to be one of the people on whom nothing is lost!” I am far from intending by this to
minimise the importance of exactness – of truth of detail. (James, The Art of Fiction)
64 What is referred to here is a competence that is not only a matter of knowledge or of
reasoning, but of adequate and particular expression. Here again, it is a question of the
expression of experience: when and how to trust in one’s experience. The attention that
James’  writing  invites  and  sustains  does  not  give  us  certainties;  rather  it  makes
uncertainty emerge: it makes experience itself an adventure in the strict sense (or, to
speak after the manner of Emerson, a true romance).  There is adventure, according to
James, in every situation that mixes uncertainty and “the taste of life.” Experience itself,
if one trusts it, becomes an adventure itself. This is maybe an unseen, but important and
still living connection between transcendentalism and pragmatism.
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